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Abstract
In recent years economics agents and systems have became more and more interact-
ing and juxtaposed, therefore the social sciences need to rely on the studies of physical
sciences to analyze this complexity in the relationships. According to this point of view
we rely on the geometrical model of the Möbius strip used in the electromagnetism
which analyzes the moves of the electrons that produce energy. We use a similar model
in a Corporate Social Responsibility context to devise a new cost function in order
to take into account of three positive crossed effects on the efficiency: i)cooperation
among stakeholders in the same sector; ii)cooperation among similar stakeholders in
different sectors and iii)the stakeholders’ loyalty towards the company. By applying
this new cost function to a firm’s decisional problem we find that investing in Cor-
porate Social Responsibility activities is ever convenient depending on the number of
sectors, the stakeholders’ sensitivity to these investments and the decay rate to alien-
ation. Our work suggests a new method of analysis which should be developed not
only at a theoretical but also at an empirical level.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, in particular from the beginning of the 21st century, the social sciences
started to strongly rely on the discoveries of physics of complexity to analyze complicated
relations between models and social phenomena (Urry, 2003). For instance this is just the
research field of the econophysics which studies the applications of theories and methods
developed by Physics in order to solve problems in Economics (for more details see Rosser,
2008). As in the studies of many physical systems, also in the social sciences there is a
growing attention to go behind the traditional notions treating various agents as separated
and distinct essences (Urry, 2003; Giddens,1984). Currently they are instead conceived as
juxtaposed entities related trough a nonlinear mechanism where causes and effects are co-
present and strongly integrated1.
In an even more globalized world very complex interactions characterize social and economic
relationships. Therefore we need models taking into account this complexity and nonlin-
earity in the connections. Such links involve multiple positive and negative feedback loops
making systems interdependent and interacting dissipatively with their environment.
In Economics this interdependence among systems and among agents is just the core of the
models of Corporate Social Responsibility (since now on CSR), which consider the global
integration between firms and stakeholders, including workers, customers and the full en-
vironment (see Becchetti et al., 2014). The CSR implies a move from the maximization of
the shareholders wealth to the satisfaction of a more complex objective function in which
interests of the other stakeholders are taken into account. On turn this creates also benefits
for the business. For instance Becchetti et al.(2014) show that since more and more profit
maximizing firms are adopting CSR practices there must be pecuniary benefits arising from
them. The authors also document that the CSR has the potential to generate several values
increasing effects by attracting better employees, enhancing their intrinsec motivation and
loyalty, reducing turnover rates, improving the efficiency and by reducing operating costs.
Moreover Becchetti and al. (2015) show that the CSR firms which take into account the
1" No party to a relation is therefore a monadic or molar entity. Each is instead a mutable function or
the character of the mode-of-being related and its capacity for relationality"(Dillon, 2000)
2
workers well-being are less exposed to business risks and profit volatility. Nevertheless CSR
improves boosting sales revenues, increases rivals costs and attracts more ethical consumers,
so that the firm can benefit from increases in her demand share.
All the above mentioned advantages can be seen as a sort of ethical capital accumulated
trough the CSR practices, which also requires the payment of additional costs. Becchetti et
al. (2014) underline, by using a dynamic model, the conditions implying that such benefits
overrun the costs. These advantages can also be considered as the result of the synergy
which relates each subsystem’s and each agent’s performance.
Thanks to this synergy net benefits from the relationships across to the stakeholders by
the virtue of their connections to the firm and the net transactional benefits across to the
business system by the virtue of the intra-organizational cooperation.
Therefore according to the CSR point of view firms and stakeholders can be depicted not as
two distinct and unconnected systems, but they are a cross-system where transfers occur in
a such a way that a business becomes a stakeholders’ interest and conversely stakeholders
well-being becomes part of the business. In this crossed-system the output of each part is
transferred across them to become the others’ input, so that these subsystems are strongly
overloaded and linked inextricably together.
According to our point of view the best metaphor, suggested by the physical sciences, to
approximate and represent this new conceptualization of links in economics systems and
between agents is the Möbius strip.
This is a topological enigma independently documented in 1858 by two mathematicians A.
F. Möbius and J.B. Listing. It is a bend of paper given a 180 degree twist prior to having
its two ends connected. The first use of the Möbius strip as a metaphor in the business re-
lationships, on our knowledge, is that of Litz (2008), who discusses an alternative approach
to business family and family business relationships.
In this work we aim to extend this approach to the CSR analysis by extensively relying
on the recently discoveries in the electromagnetism. We assimilate firm and stakeholders’
contributes to the action of electrons travelling on a Möbius strip which, unlike a regular
bend, return to a mirror reality in each count. In particular we strictly follow the model
of Yacubo et al.(2003) who show that the electrons travelling on a Möbius strip produce
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energy of higher intensity or equivalently there is a lower energy dissipation thanks to the
decreased resistance by virtue of the twist in the bend. We analyze how contributions of
the economic agents in a CSR context, thanks to the effect to the ethical capital, produce
higher benefits and a lower dissipation of the costs thanks the augmented cooperation.
The paper is divided into four sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the sec-
ond section we describe the building of the geometrical model for the electrons travelling in
a Möbius strip. In the third section we investigate how to apply this model to the behavior
of firms and economics agents in a CSR context. We define a new cost function that show
the convenience to invest in social responsible activities thanks to three positive crossed ef-
fects on the efficiency: i)cooperation among stakeholders in the same sector; ii)cooperation
among similar stakeholders in different sectors and iii)the stakeholders’ loyalty towards the
company. We provide an example of a firm’s decisional problem which decides whether to
invest in social responsibility. Our analytical results show that this is ever the optimal choice
depending on the number of sectors, the stakeholders’ sensitivity to these investments and
the decay rate to alienation. In the fourth section we discuss our conclusions.
2 How to build a geometrical model for the electrons
travelling in a Möbius strip
The Möbius strip is a bi-dimensional manifold with only one face. It can be built from a
strip of paper by joining together its both ends after having twisted one of them a half turn
(see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: How to build a Möbius strip
The Möbius strip has one side and a single border and if we move along the centre line, the meridian,
of the strip we need to go through the circle twice in order to return to the original position. This
behavior is similar to that of the electrons generating a flux periodicity of persistent currents in
a Möbius strip in Yacubo et al. (2003), who describe it by using the Hubbard model (1963).
This last is the simplest model of interacting particles (electrons) in a lattice and consists of a
Hamiltonian with only two terms: a kinetic term which represents the kinetic energy of electrons
hopping between atoms and a potential term consisting of an on-site interaction which represents
the potential energy arising from the charges on the electrons. If we assume that there are N sites
then we’ll say that if an electron tunnels from lattice site j to site l, its energy changes by an
amount −tjl. This tunneling effect is equivalent of annihilating the electron at site j and creating
it again at site l, so the portion of the Hamiltonian, the kinetic term, dealing with tunneling can
be written as
−
N∑
j,l=1
tjla
†
laj
where a†l , aj are the fermion (since electrons are fermions) creation and annihilation operators. For
many practical purposes it suffices to assume that tjl is none-zero, only when j and l are the nearest
neighbors in which case it is usually approximated by a constant t. Because of the electron may
tunnel also from lattice site l to site j, the Hamiltonian becomes
−t
N∑
j,l=1
a
†
laj + a
†
jal
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where −t
∑N
j,l=1 a
†
jal is defined Hermitian conjugate and denoted by h.c.
The potential term is
N∑
k=1
εka
†
kak
where εk represents the site energy and a
†
k, ak are the fermion creation and annihilation operators
at the site k.
Yacubo et al.(2003) consider electrons moving on a Möbius strip in the longitudinal directions on
2M wires and transverse directions on N wires. Specifically, starting from a rectangular lattice
including N × 2M sites (see Figure 2), the rectangle is then twisted by 180 degrees and its two
sides are connected, such that longitudinal wire 1 is attached to wire 2M, wire 2 is attached to wire
2M − 1 and so on (see Figure 3). The Möbius strip so constructed includes M longitudinal wires
with 2N sites on each one.
Figure 2: The electrons moving in a lattice N × 2M.
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Figure 3: The electrons moving in a Möbius strip.The previous lattice has became a
lattice 2N ×M. The area behind the green line,after the twist,shifted in the bottom
on the left.The electrons in the column M that tunneled in the M + 1 column,now
tunnel in the same column M on the corresponding replicated new element.
According to the Hubbard model (1963) the Hamiltonian is then
HMo¨bius =
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
[εnma
†
nmanm − t1e
−2ipiΦ/N
a
†
nman+1m] (1)
−t2
2N∑
n=1
M−1∑
m=1
a
†
nm+1anm −
t2
2
2N∑
n=1
a
†
nMan+NM + h.c.
where anm is the fermion operator at the site (n,m) with n = 1, 2, ..., 2N and m = 1, 2, ...,M).
The quantity εnm is the site energy so that
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
εnma
†
nmanm
represents the potential term.
The kinetic term is made up of three parts:
1. −t1
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
e−2ipiΦ/Na†nman+1m measures the longitudinal hopping, where e
−2ipiΦ/N measures
the effect of the magnetic field accumulated along the longitudinal direction on each link and
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t1 is the longitudinal hopping amplitude;
2. −t2
2N∑
n=1
M−1∑
m=1
a†nmanm measures the transverse hopping on M − 1 longitudinal wires and t2 is
the transverse hopping amplitude;
3. the transverse hopping on the last wire M is measured by − t2
2
2N∑
n=1
a
†
nMan+NM . Without the
twist the electron would tunnel from the site (n,M) to the site (n,M + 1). But, because of
the twist, now the wire M + 1 is attached to the wire M becoming the same longitudinal
wire with 2N sites on it. Therefore the site (n,M +1) is now the site (n+N,M) (see Figure
3).Obviously the sum is divided by two because the electrons tunnel only from (towards) the
original N sites.
3 The Economics of the CSR-Möbius strip
3.1 How to build a CSR-Möbius strip economics model
In this section we aim to investigate whether what we have seen in the previous one can be applied
to firms and economics agents in a CSR context. Are there some similarities between their activities
and contributions to production and the move of electrons in the strip that produces energy? At
a first sight we notice that −HMo¨bius strongly approaches a benefits-costs function. In fact, the
energy dissipation measured by ε can be assimilated to the production costs unrecovered trough
the sell of the added value of the final consumption good.
Similarly, the terms with t1 and t2 may represent the benefits associated to the joint contributions
of N stakeholders or type of stakeholeders operating in M sectors.
For instance in the generalized Leontief production function analyzed in Diewert (1971) the in-
terindustrial relations of an economy are conventionally represented by a matrix in which each
column lists the monetary value of an industry’s inputs and each row lists the value of the indus-
try’s outputs. Each cell of this matrix might correspond to the site (n,m) of the electrons in the
strip (for instance see Iyetomi et al. 2010).
Nevertheless we think that in a context of CSR this function does not take into account all the
crossed effects that social responsible activities can generate in terms of productivity and costs
saving (see Becchetti et al. 2014). In particular some of these effects concern the externalities
due to the CSR benefits on the stakeholders, which on turn are transferred into positive returns
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on the firm’s traditional activities.According to this point of view, we consider a SR company
with n = 1, 2, .., N stakeholders or cluster of stakeholders and m = 1, 2, ..., 2M activities, where
m = 1, 2, ...,M represents the traditional sectors of production of intermediate goods, necessary
to produce the final good M, while m = M + 1, ..., 2M are the specific activities devoted to the
CSR. We denote by 0 ≤ anm < 1 the contribution of the stakeholder n in the sector m measured as
percentage per unit of a product. For instance if a11 =
1
5
we say the stakeholder 1 is able to produce
the 20 per cent of a unit in a working hour. Like in a Möbius strip also in a social responsible firm
the effects of a twist may be considered as the returns due to the CSR activities on the stakeholders
and firm production, which therefore amplify the crossed contributions of different stakeholders also
operating in different sectors of the company (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: The matrix of stakeholders’contributions in a CSR context.
The stakeolder 1 contributes with a11 to the production of the sector 1 and with a12 to the produc-
tion of the sector 2 and so on. The stakeolder 2 contributes with a21 to the production of the sector
1 and with a22 to the production of the sector 2 and so on. The same for all the other stakeholders.
The value of a12M measures the expected additional contribution that the stakeholders 1 would give
thanks to the social responsible activity 2M. The same for the other social responsible activities
which are ordered in such a way that 2M is more relevant for the sector 1, 2M − 1 is more relevant
for the sector 2, etc (for instance 2M could be seen as the social responsible activities dedicated to
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assure safety work condition in sector 1, 2M − 1 those to assure safety work condition in sector 2
and so on). Therefore in this work we propose the use of a new cost function for CSR companies
suggested by (1), that in our case becomes:
HCSR = −
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
[cnm − t1(1− δ)anman+1m] + t2
2N∑
n=1
M−1∑
m=1
anm+1anm +
t2
2
2N∑
n=1
anMan+NM (2)
where
1. −
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
cnm represents the sum of the costs supported by a company for social responsible
activities devoted to each n in the sector m. The company can decide to give a prize also for
the stakeholder’s social responsible engagement and his increased productivity in the tradi-
tional sectors, so that the cost can be different from zero for the n = N +1, ..., 2N replicated
stakeholders.
2. t1
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
(1−δ)anman+1m, that we call the neighbouroud efficiency term, measures the gains
associated to the crossed contributions of n in the sector m with the nearest n + 1 in the
same sector. For instance if a11 =
1
5
and a21 =
1
7
, when the SR stakeholder 1 supports
the stakeholder 2 helping him to produce his share 1
7
, the stakeholder 1 contributes with his
ability of 1
5
to the production of 1 + 1
7
units of the good. Therefore his total contribution
is now 1
5
(
1 + 1
7
)
. Obviously also the stakeholder 2 can support the stakeholder 1 and this
would correspond to Hermitian conjugate of this term. In the rest of the paper, to avoid
excessive complexity, we don’t consider the hermitian conjugate of (2) because this doesn’t
affect our analysis. Moreover we assume that 0 < δ < 1 is the decay rate due to the possible
effect of alienation (caused for instance by satiety, low free time, etc.). Finally t1 represents
the sensitivity of the stakeholders’ contributions to the SR activities devoted to them;
3. t2
2N∑
n=1
M−1∑
m=1
anm+1anm, that we call sector cooperation efficiency term, measures the gains as-
sociated to the crossed contributions of n in the sectorm with the others type n in the nearest
sector m+1. Moreover t2 (which can be equal or different from t1) measures the sensitivity of
the stakeholders contributions to the SR activities devoted to their and to other nearest sector.
4. t2
2
2N∑
n=1
anMan+NM , that we call loyalty efficiency term, measures the gains associated to the
10
increased productivity of each n which contributes to the production of the final good M
twice: directly trough his own task and indirectly trough the increased efficiency and coop-
erative attitudes.
Clearly all the above mentioned crossed effects could run among more distant stakeholders and
sectors. Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that this would imply not negligeable transaction
costs, necessary to raise useful and continuous connections among them. Moreover the associated
benefits should be netted from the intermediate effects running among the nearest ones. Therefore,
all this things considered, it is possible to assume, in our model, that those effects are very low and
less important for the company when she decides her investment in CSR.
Moreover, we think that the main point is that SR firms make specific investments (the sectors
fromM+1 to 2M) to foster stakeholders’ socially responsible contributions and productivity(which
for examples are empirically measured by some index as in the KLD metrics,see Becchetti et al.
2015) so to reverse the upper side of our matrix in the lower bound on the left just as if we have
two replicated stakeholders. The traditional one making is own task, and the second is a sort of
replicated socially responsible stakeholders adding new contributions to the firm. Therefore the
order matters as investments and return are specific into the firm. Obviously we can imagine there
are also externalities requiring no specific orders, but they are difficult to measure and not related
to specific company’s activities and investments while CSR measures are specific for sectors and
stakeholders so implying specific returns. In particular the three above mentioned effects depend
on the extremely strick and precise conditions of how CSR investments operate so that the twist
is just a Mobius strip twist rather than some less well-ordered reshuffling of cross-cutting effects
across the stakeholders.
In that follows we aim to apply this function to a general decisional problem of a company which
wants to minimize the costs taking into account these crossed benefits due to the SR activities.
3.2 An application to a firm decisional problem with constant con-
tributions and costs
In this section we consider only one type of stakeholders and specifically we assume that there are
N workers in m = 1, 2, ...,M traditional sectors. We assume that the total production is equal to
the sum of the contributions of these workers, which could be measured in term of pieces produced
by worker in that sector in a working hour, which is constant for each worker and sector, anm = a,
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with a ∈ R and 0 ≤ a < 1 for all n = 1, 2, ..., N and m = 1, 2, ...,M. Therefore if we denote by p
the price of the final good and by w the wages paid to workers, the firm’s profit function is:
pi =
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
(p− w)anm = NMa(p− w).
We also assume that the company finances the social responsible activities with an expense c ≥ 0
equal for each sector and worker and proportional to their contributions, that is cnm = ca for
all n = 1, 2, ..., N and m = 1, 2, ...,M. Notice that this assumptions constant expense c is not
trivial and unrealistic. In fact, if we consider the same type of stakeholders, in order to avoid any
discrimination the firm should invest, for each them, the same amount which is proportional only to
the own contribution (meritocracy). Otherwise it might have counterproductive effects (like envy,
frustration due to inequality, etc)instead of stimulating cooperation and efficiency. In addition we
suppose that the worker’s sensitivities t1 and t2 are equal and are related to the investment in CSR
through the function
t1 = t2 = k(ca)
β
where k is a positive constant and β ∈ R.
Under these assumptions, the company, for given values p and w, wants to maximize the benefits
associated to the investment in CSR measured by the function (2) that in this case is
HCSR(c) = −
2N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
[ca− t1(1− δ)a
2] + t2
2N∑
n=1
M−1∑
m=1
a
2 +
t2
2
2N∑
n=1
a
2 (3)
subjected to
NMa[(p− w)− c] ≥ 0 (4)
Obviously the constraint (4) implies that the firm can’t expend in CSR more than what she would
earn without social responsible activities.
Simplifying (3) we get
HCSR(c) = −ca2NM + 2kc
β
NM(1− δ)a2+β + 2kcβN(M − 1)a2+β + kcβNa4+β (5)
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Therefore the company chooses the value of c that solves
dHCSR
dc
= 0
under (4), that is
dHCSR
dc
= −a2NM + 2βkcβ−1NM(1− δ)a2+β + 2βkcβ−1N(M − 1)a2+β + kβcβ−1Na4+β = 0
c
β−1
βk[2M(1− δ)a1+β + 2(M − 1)a1+β + a3+β] = 2M.
We can distinguish three cases:
i) for β > 1
c
∗
1 =
β−1
√
2M
βka1+β [2M(2− δ)− 2 + a2]
which is a feasible solution only if c∗1 < p−w. We can see that c
∗
1 increases for high values of
δ. In fact, being convenient to enforce workers’ sensitivity to SR to earn the high benefits due
to β > 1, the company should invest more c to counteract the negative effect of δ. Instead
the optimal c decreases for high values of β because no huge investments are necessary to
stimulate workers’ sensitivity and the firm can save costs getting the same great benefits.
Finally, given the budget constraint, if there are many sectors M the company must invest a
little amount c for each of them, therefore c decreases for high values of M.
ii) for β < 1
c
∗
2 =
1−β
√
βka1+β[2M(2 − δ)− 2 + a2]
2M
.
Obviously the above mentioned effects of δ, β and M on the optimal value of c are reversed
when the workers are low sensitive to SR activities.
iii) for β = 1
dHCSR
dc
= ka2[2M(2 − δ)− 2 + a2]− 2M
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which is constant. Therefore, if
ka
2[2M(2− δ)− 2 + a2]− 2M > 0
it is ever convenient to invest in CSR and the company chooses the optimal value of c
satisfying 4, as she can easily recover the costs from the proportional increase in t for k ≥ 1.
This condition is more probably satisfied for high values of k and a.
4 Conclusions
In the ongoing times characterized by an even more globalized world, the reduction of distances
thank to technologies make people and systems (economic, social, cultural, etc) strongly interre-
lated and juxtaposed. Therefore what happens somewhere influences things happening elsewhere.
From a theoretical point of view to study these more interacting systems the traditional economic
models are improved also relying on the discoveries of the physical sciences to take into account
the several crossed effects among the agents’ actions. In particular in a CSR context her related
activities generate a sort of interlinked effects which should be adequately analyzed. In this work
we extensively draw from the physical science and specifically from the geometrical model of the
Möbius strip where the electrons move in several directions to produce energy.
Similarly in a CSR context the social responsible activities have the effects going in several direc-
tions which can increase the stakeholders’ productivity and efficiency so reducing production costs.
Therefore we devise a new cost-function where three crossed effects are at work:1) increases in
the efficiency in virtue of the augmented cooperation among the nearest stakeholders in the same
sector; 2) increases in efficiency in virtue of the augmented cooperation among stakeholders in the
nearest sectors;3) increases in the efficiency due to the augmented stakeholders loyalty towards the
vision of the company (and also the management and the shareholders)and so towards her final
production.
We show how the benefits of the CSR in terms of those three effects incentive the investment in CSR
activities and we also provide an example on how this new cost-function can be used to analyze a
simple SR firm’s decisional problem. Our results show that investing in CSR activities can ever be
convenient depending on the number of sectors, the stakeholders’ sensitivity to these investments
and the decay rate to alienation.
We think that this approach could make light on effects in productivity which not have been ade-
quately taken into account and need to be more analyzed both at a theoretical and empirical level.
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In particular proceeding from our theoretical model new empirical measures on these crossed effects
should be produced to translate our model into reality.
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